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FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION: RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES
DEAN S. DASKAL*
The privilege against self-incrimination, embodied in the
fifth amendment,1 may be asserted whenever an individual's
testimonial evidence might tend to subject him to criminal re-
sponsibility, regardless of the nature of the proceeding.2 As a
result, this privilege may threaten the integrity of federal civil
litigation by threatening the equality of access to sources of
proof.3 The purpose of this article is to explore the implica-
tions of the privilege in federal civil litigation and to examine
the range of responsive judicial policies consistent with the
values promoted by the privilege.
I. THE POLICY OF THE PRIVILEGE
History has been of little help in assessing the policies
which support the privilege against self-incrimination. The
privilege originated in early English religious and political dis-
putes and rose in importance as a defensive weapon against
prosecutions for heresy and sedition.4 In addition, during the
* B.A., University of Chicago, 1975; J.D., Harvard University, 1978; Law Clerk to
the Hon. Thomas R. McMillen, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of
Illinois, 1978-80. Mr. Daskal is an associate in the firm of Wildman, Harrold, Allen, &
Dixon, Chicago, Illinois.
1. In pertinent part, the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "
2. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
3. E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 507-08 (1947).
4. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); C.
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seventeenth century, the principle that no man should be
forced to incriminate himself achieved general acceptance in
the English courts, apparently due to an intuitive notion that
it was improper to collect criminal evidence by this means.
Accordingly, the privilege in England developed specifically in
opposition to religious and political abuses, and generally in
opposition to the collection of criminal evidence from the ac-
cused under oath. The privilege was subsequently included in
the United States Constitution as a precept adopted from the
then recent English legal tradition.
The Supreme Court has paid little, if any, attention to his-
torical development of the privilege. With a slight bow to his-
tory, the Court declared that a "noble principle" such as the
privilege against self-incrimination "often transcends its ori-
gins."' 5 Attempts to assess the policies underlying the privi-
lege, therefore, have been more a matter of argument than of
historical analysis. Wigmore, for instance, considered a dozen
policies that had been advanced to support the privilege and
concluded that two were primary: first, the prevention of tor-
ture or other inhumane treatment, and second, the contribu-
tion of the privilege to a fair balance between the state and
the individual in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
activity.6 On the latter point, Wigmore urged, and the Su-
preme Court has recently emphasized, that the privilege
helped enforce the requirement that the state shoulder the
entire load in prosecuting criminal cases.
Another closely related policy is that the individual must
be protected from government abuse of its investigative and
prosecutorial powers." This rationale rests, in part, on the no-
tion that the privilege assures our accusatorial, rather than in-
quisitorial, system of criminal justice. In addition, this policy
encompasses the concept that the privilege guards against po-
MCCORMCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 114 (2d ed. 1972).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting United States v. Grune-
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 581 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957)).
6. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 297-318 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
7. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
8. Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
24 U. Cm. L. REv. 472, 484-87 (1957).
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litical, religious, and other investigative persecution.9
Perhaps another expression of the same policy is the argu-
ment that the privilege against self-incrimination seeks to pre-
serve individual privacy.10 However, it does so only to a pecu-
liarly limited extent, that is, only insofar as compelled self-
incrimination is threatened. Moreover, this right of privacy
may be phrased in terms of privacy of individual belief, as in
the sense discussed above, or in terms of the individual's right
to be let alone until the government establishes probable
cause for prosecution. Such references to privacy may simply
reflect a modern restatement of other older, related values.
At times the Supreme Court has addressed the privilege as
if it were an aspect of the constitutional right to privacy."' In
Fisher v. United States,12 however, the Court criticized the
notion that the privilege could be cut "completely loose from
the moorings of its language," to "make it serve as a general
protector of privacy" except where compelled testimonial self-
incrimination was involved.'3 Thus, the constitutional privi-
lege may not be construed to protect privacy beyond the lim-
its imposed by the language of the fifth amendment, which in
turn suggests that the Court is unwilling to utilize a privacy
concept as an aid to construction of the privilege when there
is some doubt whether the privilege applies.
Finally, the privilege establishes a fair method for the con-
duct of criminal trials. The state has the burden of establish-
ing its case without the aid of testimony from the accused and
the accused has the right to a favorable verdict without testi-
fying as a witness in his own defense.
Unfortunately, in reviewing issues pertinent to the privi-
lege, the United States Supreme Court has devoted little at-
tention to discussion of the policies underlying the privilege.
Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to survey the un-
9. Id. at 485; E. GmiSwOLD, THE FnrH AMENDMENT TODAY; THmsE SPEEcHEs
(1955); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 671, 696-98 (1968); Griswold, The Right to Be rLet Alone,
55 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 216 (1960).
10. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193;
Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
11. Bells v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 327 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
12. 425 U.S. 391, 399-401 (1976).
13. Id. at 401.
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derlying policies of the privilege was offered by the Court in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor:14
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by in-
humane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load," . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life,". '. . ; our distrust
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes a "shelter to the guilty," is often
"a protection to the innocent. ' 15
The Supreme Court has subsequently held that the basic pur-
poses of the privilege do not relate to protection of the inno-
cent from conviction.10
II. APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE IN PRACTICE
The Supreme Court has extended the scope of the privi-
lege beyond simply protecting an accused from being com-
pelled to bear witness against himself in a criminal proceed-
ing. The scope of the privilege now includes any form of
proceeding where an answer might tend to subject a witness
to criminal penalties.17 The right to assert the privilege exists
irrespective of the type of proceeding, that is, whether it be
criminal or civil in nature.1 8 The privilege does not, however,
protect a witness against the use of his testimony for purposes
14. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
15. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
16. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). While the privilege
may on occasion protect innocent parties, it does not serve to directly protect the
truth-seeking function of the federal courts.
17. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
18. E.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
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other than the imposition of criminal liabilities.19 Thus, if the
witness were granted immunity, and thereby protected from
the subsequent use of his testimony against himself in a crim-
inal action, the protection afforded by the privilege would be
satisfied,20 and the witness' testimony could be judicially
compelled.2
Several difficult questions arise in applying the privilege.
The first question is who should make the determination that
the privilege does or does not apply? In United States v.
Burr,22 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall first declared that it is up
to the court to determine whether any answer to a question
could tend to incriminate the witness. The courts retain this
function today in order to prevent assertions of the privilege
founded on trifling or imaginary hazards of incrimination.2
The trial court can require an answer if it clearly appears that
the witness is mistaken in his assertion of the privilege. In so
doing, the court must rely on its own perception of the pecu-
liarities of the case, as well as the facts in evidence.
A second difficult question is what standard should be
used to regulate the assertion of the privilege. The modem
standard governing fifth amendment claims is set forth in
Hoffman v. United States.24 The Hoffman standard was lodg-
ed in sweeping terms:
19. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896). In United States v. Apfelbaum, 100 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1980), the Court noted
that the privilege does not extend to consequences of a noncriminal nature, "such as
threats of liability in civil suits." However, as discussed in the text below, nonim-
munized testimony cannot be compelled by threats of noncriminal consequences.
Furthermore, although the privilege protects the witness only against compelled
testimony that might subject him to criminal liabilities, the latter phrase includes
liabilities that, although civil in form, are in their nature criminal. A chief example is
a forfeiture of property due to offenses committed by the owner. United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). See generally United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
20. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 411 (1972).
21. E.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
22. 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C. Va. 1807)(No. 14,692e).
23. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244
U.S. 362 (1917). Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968), states that the
witness cannot assert the privilege where confronted by merely trifling or imaginary
hazards of incrimination. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406
U.S. 472, 478 (1972), points out that the privilege does not protect against remote and
speculative possibilities of incrimination.
24. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
1980]
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[1]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were re-
quired to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is
usually required to be established in court, he would be
compelled to surrender the very protection which the privi-
lege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it
need only be evident from the implications of the question,
in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer
to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be an-
swered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure
could result.
In this setting, it was not "perfectly clear, from a care-
ful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that
the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot pos-
sibly have such tendency" to incriminate.2 5
Hence, the privilege extends not only to answers that could
directly incriminate the witness, but also includes those an-
swers that could furnish a link in a chain of evidence sufficient
to support prosecution. A witness, therefore, should rarely be
challenged in his assertion of the privilege.2 The protection of
the privilege is confined, however, to instances where the wit-
ness "has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct
answer."
27
While the rigor of the Hoffman standard is apparent, in
practice the standard is augmented by two sub-rules. First,
the trial court is not permitted to require an in camera expla-
nation by the witness to justify his assertion of the privilege.
Thus, the court may not broaden the witness' disclosure be-
yond that which is permitted in open court. 8 Second, the
court cannot consider the practical likelihood that any com-
pelled disclosure will ever actually be utilized in a prosecu-
tion. The court must content itself with ascertaining whether
the disclosure might tend to support a legally potential
prosecution.2
25. Id. at 486-87, 488 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
26. E.g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
27. 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
28. In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1967).
29. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th
Cir. 1980) (dictum); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1979) (and cases cited therein at 870). But see In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litiga-
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A witness can, however, waive his right to assert the privi-
lege.30 Brown v. United Statess imposed a constructive
waiver doctrine in the context of a civil proceeding. In Brown,
the witness voluntarily testified in her own defense in a denat-
uralization suit. She was held in criminal contempt by the
trial judge for her refusal to answer relevant questions on
cross-examination. The Court held that Brown could not as-
sert her privilege to block relevant cross-examination because
she had waived the privilege by testifying on related matters
during direct examination. The Court grounded this holding
on the necessity of assuring fairness to the adversary, as well
as preserving the integrity of the civil litigation:
[W]hen a witness voluntarily testifies, the privilege against
self-incrimination is amply respected without need of ac-
cepting testimony freed from the antiseptic test of the ad-
versary process. The witness himself, certainly if he is a
party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of in-
quiry. Such a witness has the choice, after weighing the ad-
vantage of the privilege against self-incrimination against
the advantage of putting forward his version of the facts and
his reliability as a witness, not to testify at all. He cannot
reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him not
only this choice but, if he elects to testify, an immunity from
cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dis-
pute. It would make of the Fifth Amendment not only a hu-
mane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but
a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to
tell.... The interests of the other party and regard for the
function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become
relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations deter-
mining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
tion, 465 F. Supp. 618, 625 (N.D. nM 1979) ("Sustaining a civil witness' refusal to
testify on fifth amendment grounds every time an answer might give rise to some
theoretically possible future criminal prosecution, no matter how remote, would sig-
nal a virtual end to discovery in civil cases. Assertions of the fifth amendment which,
as a practical matter, are frivolous should not be allowed to frustrate discovery in
civil cases.").
But where a theoretical possiblity of prosecution is lacking, e.g., where the appli-
cable limitation period has expired, the witness may not properly assert the privilege.
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896).
30. E.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).




The Hoffman and Brown decisions thus demonstrate the
Supreme Court's conviction that the privilege be accorded a
"liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to
secure,'3 even though a "balance of considerations" will ulti-
mately determine its limitations in the context of a civil
proceeding."
Finally, it should also be noted that the privilege is availa-
ble only to natural persons, as distinguished from corporate
entities and the like.3 5 The privilege thus affords no protec-
tion against the production of corporate records by one who
holds them in his corporate capacity, even though they may
tend to incriminate the custodian personally. However, the
custodians of corporate records or other managing agents re-
tain their individual privileges not to testify concerning corpo-
rate matters that may tend to incriminate them in their indi-
vidual capacities.87
III. LIMrTATIONS AND BURDENS ON THE ASSERTION OF THE
PRIVILEGE
In the 1964 case of Malloy v. Hogan,3 8 the United States
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment proscription
against self-incrimination applies to the separate states
through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy emphasized that
32. Id. at 155-56. Mr. Justice Black argued, in dissent, that there were less restric-
tive alternatives to the criminal contempt sanction which could adequately protect
the adversary and the court from a one-sided, distorted version of the truth. His re-
medial alternatives included an order striking the one-sided testimony, with a limit-
ing instruction to the jury, and "where the prejudice to the opposing party was ex-
treme and irremediable" the court might even enter judgment in the opposing party's
favor. 356 U.S. at 160 (Black, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed that these were
appropriate alternatives. 356 U.S. at 156 n.5.
33. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). See Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-29 (1956).
34. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958).
35. E.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); George Campbell Painting
Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968).
36. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911). These decisions would be supported today, even assuming that a corpora-
tion or similar legal entity could claim the privilege, by the later holding in Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compelled production of nonpersonal, business
related papers is not offensive to the constitutional privilege).
37. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
38. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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the privilege guarantees the right of a person to remain silent,
"unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence."39 This
decision quickly produced a series of rulings which circum-
scribed the limitations or burdens which states had imposed
on the assertion of the privilege. In Griffin v. California,"0 for
instance, the Court held that the privilege forbade either com-
ment by the prosecution on the accused's failure to testify in
his own criminal defense, or instructions by the trial court
that such silence is evidence of guilt. The Court criticized
such commentary as a "penalty" imposed by the trial court
for the defendant's assertion of the privilege which was in-
tended to cut down on the use of the privilege "by making its
assertion costly."41
Outside the criminal area, the Supreme Court has focused
upon the effect of the assertion of the privilege in matters of
public employment and licensing. For example, in Spevack v.
Klein,'42 the Court held that a lawyer could not constitution-
ally be disbarred for his privileged refusal to comply with a
subpoena issued in a disciplinary proceeding. A more impor-
tant case was Garrity v. New Jersey,'48 decided the same day
as Spevack. In Garrity, certain public officers testified during
an official investigation without asserting the privilege,
thereby waiving it. They did so after a warning that they
would be subject to discharge under state law if they declined
to fully testify. The Supreme Court held that the officers'
statements were coerced by the threatened loss of employ-
ment, thereby vitiating their waivers of the privilege, and
making the use of their statements unconstitutional in a sub-
sequent criminal trial. Garrity thus fashioned a constitutional
"use" immunity for statements made under threat of removal
from public employment." The Court subsequently made it
clear that the immunity found in Garrity would prevent re-
movals from public employment whenever a waiver of the
privilege was demanded and the witness was not informed of
39. Id. at 8.
40. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
41. Id. at 614.
42. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
43. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
44. Compare Garrity with notes 143-49 infra, and accompanying text.
1980]
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his protection against use of his coerced statements in any
subsequent criminal proceeding.45
Garrity, in a subsequent line of cases, has continued unim-
peded.4 6 Contemporaneously, however, the Court has pro-
duced a separate series of decisions addressing limitations and
burdens on the assertion of other constitutional rights.
Simmons v. United States47 was perhaps the starting
point. At trial, statements made by the defendant at a hearing
on his motion to suppress the fruits of an allegedly unconsti-
tutional seizure were introduced as evidence of his own guilt.
The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, find-
ing that the admission of such testimony would deter the
presentation of fourth amendment claims. The Court con-
cluded that "an undeniable tension is created ' 4 between
fourth and fifth amendment rights unless the testimony of-
fered by a defendant at his suppression hearing is inadmissi-
ble against him on the issue of his guilt at trial, assuming that
he properly raises an objection to its use.
Shortly after Simmons, the Court decided United States
v. Jackson.49 In Jackson, a statute subjected the defendant to
the risk of the death penalty if he chose a jury trial. He was
not subject to the death penalty, however, if he submitted to a
bench trial or pleaded guilty. The Court found that a statu-
45. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v.
Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968). See George Campbell Painting
Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968), where in contrast to the implied immunity found
in Garrity, the Court upheld the statutory imposition of adverse consequences upon a
corporation receiving public business, where its president (a director and shareholder
of a closely held corporation) declined to testify before a grand jury and to waive any
immunity he may have possessed. The sanction was in form imposed upon the corpo-
ration, which lacked a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and could
not take advantage of the claimed invalidity of the sanction as if the sanction had
been imposed directly upon the president. Compare Reid with Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70 (1973), which involved the same set of statutory provisions at issue in
Reid. The key distinction is that Reid involved a contracting corporation, while the
aggrieved parties in Turley were architects receiving public business. As individuals,
they were entitled to assert the personal privilege against self-incrimination.
46. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70 (1973). In Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, the Court invalidated the statutory removal
of unsalaried political party officeholders who refused to waive their privilege and to
testify before a special grand jury. 431 U.S. at 804-09.
47. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
48. Id. at 394.
49. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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tory provision having no purpose or effect other than to penal-
ize the exercise of one's constitutional right to a jury trial was
patently unconstitutional.50 Implicitly adopting a "least re-
strictive means" test, the Court held that the challenged pro-
vision needlessly chilled the exercise of constitutional trial
rights and was therefore unenforceable.51
A process of retrenchment began shortly after Jackson. In
Brady v. United States,52 the Court held that habeas corpus
relief was unavailable to a prisoner who had pleaded guilty
under the statute at issue in United States v. Jackson.5 3 The
Court rejected the prisoner's claim that the death penalty
provision condemned in Jackson operated to coerce his guilty
plea, and held that Jackson did not alter the standard for
evaluating a waiver of constitutional rights through a guilty
plea. The test remained whether the waiver was voluntary,
knowing, intelligent and exercised with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." The
Court concluded that under this test, the statute did not co-
erce an involuntary plea and the plea was intelligently made
with advice of competent counsel.5 5 Subsequently, a number
of decisions followed the Brady rationale in rejecting similar
claims for relief from prior guilty pleas.58
50. Id. at 581.
51. Id. at 582: "The question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental'
rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and there-
fore excessive." Thus the Court expressly refused the suggestion that burdens on con-
stitutional rights are legitimate wherever they are merely incidental to a valid legisla-
tive purpose, and required that an alternative, less restrictive of constitutional rights,
be adopted where available. The United States Supreme Court has found that stat-
utes which curtail or burden the exercise of constitutional rights are valid only if the
statute is the least restrictive means to a legitimate government end. Hence, the pro-
cedural means to a legitimate government end must be defined as narrowly as pos-
sible to prevent any unnecessary infringment of constitutional rights. NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964).
52. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
53. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
54. 397 U.S. at 745-48.
55. Id. at 756-58.
56. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). Justice Brennan wrote
a dissenting opinion in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 799 (1970), and con-
curred in the result of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Justice Brennan
argued that intimations in the Court's opinions incorrectly suggested that the invol-
untary plea concept encompassed only the situation where a defendant's will "has
been literally overborne." 397 U.S. at 801-02. Citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
1980]
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While the "guilty plea" cases, such as Brady, could have
been distinguished,57 the Court has declined to do so. In Mc-
Gautha v. California,58 for instance, the Court confronted a
challenge to Ohio law, which provided for the joint determina-
tion of guilt and punishment in a single trial proceeding in
capital cases. The petitioner contended that this scheme per-
mitted him to remain silent on the issue of guilt only at the
cost of surrendering his opportunity to address the jury on the
sentencing question. Because his right to be heard on the sen-
tencing issue may be viewed as an aspect of due process, peti-
tioner submitted that the Ohio procedure created an intolera-
ble conflict between constitutional rights, similar to the
conflict condemned in Simmons v. United States.5 9
However, Mr. Justice Harlan, author of the Simmons opin-
ion, reasoned for the Court in McGautha that the burden on
the petitioner's fifth amendment rights was insubstantial.
Simmons was to be applied in view of Brady and the other
"guilty plea" cases.8 0 Finding that criminal procedure and the
legal system generally are replete with situations requiring the
making of difficult judgments, the Court stated that a defen-
dant's constitutional right to choose whichever option he pre-
fers does not constitutionally forbid a requirement that he
make a choice. "The threshold question," concluded the
Court, "is whether compelling the election impairs to an ap-
preciable extent any of the policies behind the rights in-
493 (1967) as an example, he countered that the involuntary plea concept must also
include a surrender of rights "influenced by considerations that the government can-
not properly introduce," 397 U.S. at 802, such as the threat of an unconstitutional
death penalty provision (or the threatened loss of public employment).
57. One option was to hold the result in United States v. Jackson prospective
only. As the dissent noted, 397 U.S. at 807, the result of the Brady holding was that
those who challenged the death penalty provision on direct appeal would prevail,
while those who pled guilty were deprived of any remedy.
More practically, the Brady result could be explained in terms of the near impos-
sibility of accurately detecting those instances in which "the death penalty scheme
exercised a significant influence" on the decision to plead guilty. Cf. 397 U.S. at 808
(separate opinion). Given the possibly great lapses of time involved, and the near
certainty that all testimony or other evidence is that of prisoner or his counsel, the
fact-finding process would be greatly hampered.
58. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated on other grounds 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
59. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
60. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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volved."' 1 The single proceeding required by Ohio law did not
unconstitutionally limit or burden the defendant's right to re-
main silent on the issue of guilt by depriving him of his right
to address the jury on the sentencing question. 2
Subsequent decisions have tended to follow the lines es-
tablished in McGautha.es In determining the legitimacy of
challenged practices, emphasis has often been placed upon
whether a practice furthers rational, permissible state goals."
The limitations and burdens have at times been found to be
merely incidental to a state's legitimate purpose,6 even
though Jackson rejected such an approach. In fact, Jackson
has occasionally been interpreted as merely establishing that a
challenged practice must not be a means of punishing or pe-
nalizing the assertion of constitutional rights.66 Moreover,
since McGautha, there has been little effort to determine
whether a less restrictive alternative would serve equally well
a state's legitimate goals.6
Nevertheless, Garrity and its progeny6 can be easily rec-
onciled with the cases following from Simmons. 9 In Garrity,
the Supreme Court recognized the state's substantial interest
in determining whether public employees were faithfully exe-
cuting their duties.70 However, the Court found that these le-
gitimate interests of the state would not be prejudiced by
granting use immunity, which would allow the state to fully
investigate the conduct of public employees.7 1 Waivers co-
61. 402 U.S. at 213.
62. Id. at 213-15.
63. The chief examples are Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980); Corbitt v.
New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976); Chaf-
fin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
64. E.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2129 (1980); Corbitt v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973).
65. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1973).
66. Id. at 32-33 n.20. The fact that Jackson involved the death penalty has also
been underscored. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 217 (1978).
67. Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), is perhaps the best example. Id.
at 634-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431
U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
69. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
70. E.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1968).
71. E.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973).
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erced through threats of removal from public employment
were viewed as wholly separable from the state's legitimate
goals, and thus, as a needless burden which impaired the pol-
icy of the privilege.
IV. LIMITATIONS AND BURDENS ON THE ASSERTION OF THE
PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Garrity and its progeny had an immediate impact on the
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination in civil
cases. During the period in which the Supreme Court was de-
veloping its approach to the burdens and limitations on the
exercise of constitutional rights, including the privilege
against self-incrimination, two cases in particular were de-
cided which clarified the implications of Garrity on civil
proceedings.
The first 72 of the two cases concerned the misbranding and
interstate shipment of drugs. The defendants were a corpora-
tion, its president, and vice-president. While the defendants
were under criminal investigation, the government filed a civil
suit for seizure of certain allegedly misbranded company
products, and served extensive written interrogatories on the
defendants. Before the interrogatories were answered, defen-
dants were notified that the government contemplated crimi-
nal action against them in connection with the misbranded
products.
After the defendants' objections to the interrogatories were
overruled, and after their motion for a stay of the civil pro-
ceeding pending the outcome of the contemplated criminal ac-
tion was denied, they filed answers to the interrogatories. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals later found that much of the
information supplied in answer to the interrogatories was nec-
essary to the government's criminal case.78 The criminal trial
court, however, denied the defendants' motion to quash the
indictment or to suppress all evidence and leads derived from
the civil discovery.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the decision to an-
swer the interrogatories was in no sense voluntary.7 ' The court
72. United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, Inc., 407 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1969).
73. Id. at 572.
74. Id. at 573.
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believed that the defendants had three options open to them
after the trial court had overruled the corporation's objections
to the interrogatories: (1) they could have persisted in their
refusal to answer, which almost certainly would have resulted
in the loss of the civil action, (2) they could have answered
falsely, subjecting them to a perjury prosecution, or (3) they
could have answered truthfully, supplying the government
with evidence for use in its criminal prosecution. The court of
appeals held that it was unconstitutional to force the natural
person defendants-the president and vice-president-to
elect one of these three choices, because these choices unduly
burdened the defendants' constitutional privileges as outlined
in Garrity. The individual defendants were unconstitutionally
put to a choice of either answering the interrogatories fully or
suffering a loss of their property. In addition, the court re-
jected an argument that defendant Kordel, the president and
dominant corporate personality, suffered no infringment of his
privilege because he personally made no claim to the seized
property and signed no answers to interrogatories. The court
reasoned that the corporation was merely the device through
which defendant Kordel sold his products. However, the court
affirmed the corporation's criminal conviction, noting that it
possessed no constitutional privilege of its own. .
The Supreme Court reversed in United States v. Korde76
and reinstated the individual defendants' convictions. The
Court noted that defendants' counsel never asserted any fifth
amendment objection to the interrogatories, and indeed, ex-
pressly disavowed any self-incrimination issue with respect to
the corporation. Thus, the court of appeals erred in describing
75. Id. at 575. The Supreme Court later indicated that the corporation's convic-
tion was originally reversed in the court of appeals, then reinstated on the govern-
ment's petition for rehearing. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1970). The
Supreme Court denied the corporation's certiorari petition. 395 U.S. 935 (1969).
Once having agreed with the settled principle that a corporation receives no pro-
tection from the self-incrimination clause (note 35 supra, and accompanying text), it
is remarkable that the court did not correct its discussion of Kordel's rights, 407 F.2d
at 575. The appellate court in effect pierced the corporate veil in defendant Kordel's
favor, allowing him to assert his individual privilege with respect to interrogatories
addressed to his corporation, the sole claimant in the civil action. Kordel did not
personally sign the answers on behalf of the corporation; they were signed by code-
fendant Feldten, the corporate vice-president.
76. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
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the options available to the individual defendants; a fourth
option was the assertion of their constitutional privilege."
Further, the Court found that the absence of any corporate
privilege against self-incrimination does not bar an individual
assertion of the privilege, where appropriate, in civil proceed-
ings. 8 In the event that no corporate agent could have signed
answers to the interrogatories without risking self-incrimina-
tion-a very unlikely situation7 -the Court was willing to as-
sume that the appropriate remedy might have been a protec-
tive order postponing civil discovery until the conclusion of
the criminal action. However, the record demonstrated that
"nobody associated with the corporation asserted his privilege
at all."' 0
As to defendant Kordel, who never signed any answers to
interrogatories, the Court concluded that not only was he not
in a position to claim the privilege, but, given the manner in
which corporations must act, that is, through agents, the cor-
poration could not be viewed as asserting the privilege on
Kordel's behalf.81 The Court further ruled that the trial court
77. Id. at 7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) is clear that privileged matters are not discov-
erable. However, the law generally requires that the privilege specifically be asserted.
E.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-56 (1976); United States ex rel.
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1927).
78. 397 U.S. at 7-8. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See notes 17-18,
supra, and accompanying text.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a), in pertinent part provides that "if the party served is a
public or private corporation or a partnership or association" then the interrogatories
shall be answered by "any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is
available to the party."
As the Court noted in Kordel, 397 U.S. at 8, the corporation is obliged to appoint
an agent who can answer the interrogatories without fear of self-incrimination, fur-
nishing such information as is available to the corporation. General Dynamics Corp.
v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973) (and the knowledge of its officers and
employees, relative to the subject matter of the action, is imputed to the corporation
for this purpose); United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, Etc., 265 F.2d 332 (7th
Cir. 1959); United States v. 42 Jars, Etc., 162 F. Supp. 944 (D.N.J. 1958), afl'd, 264
F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1959). The last two decisions cited agree that even the corporation's
attorney would be an adequate agent for this purpose of preparing and signing the
answers.
80. 397 U.S. at 9.
81. Id. at 10: "The Government brought its libel against the goods; the corpora-
tion, not Kordel, appeared as claimant. The Government subsequently prosecuted
Kordel as an officer of the company. If anyone has sought to cut through the corpo-
rate facade so far as the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned, it is Kordel: he has,
in effect, attempted to fashion a self-incrimination claim by combining testimony
that he never gave and an assertion of the privilege that he never made with another
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was not constitutionally obliged to stay the civil action pend-
ing the outcome of any possible criminal proceedings.8 2 In ad-
dition, the government's conduct was not found to offend due
process principles.83
United States v. Kordel demonstrates that the fifth
amendment privilege does not bar the pursuit of civil reme-
dies against an individual when he is under the shadow of po-
tential criminal action. There is nothing unconstitutional
about requiring an individual either to assert his privilege or
to waive it during a civil proceeding. The use of his testimony
in a subsequent criminal proceeding is permissible if the indi-
vidual waives his privilege by failing to assert it in the civil
proceeding. The privilege, even if broadly interpreted as in
Garrity, does not exempt the individual from the ordinary
burdens of a civil proceeding.8 However, if an individual
chooses to assert his constitutional privilege in a civil action,
he will be deprived of any benefit that his testimony might
have given him, since Brown v. United States6 construed a
voluntary offer of testimony as a waiver of the privilege. Be-
cause his chances for a successful claim or defense may there-
fore be jeopardized, his decision to assert the privilege is not
without civil consequences.8"
The difficult decision of whether to assert the privilege
raises another question relevant to civil litigation: may an ad-
versary in a civil action comment in closing argument upon
the failure of the defendant to testify in the proceeding? In
other words, should any legal weight be given to the defen-
dant's silence in the face of adverse evidence? In Palmigiano
v. Baxter,s 7 this question arose in the context of a prison dis-
ciplinary proceeding. A plaintiff brought a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging deprivations of
his procedural rights in the administration of prison disci-
assertion of the privilege that his company never had."
82. 397 U.S. at 11.
83. Id.
84. 397 U.S. at 12-13.
85. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
86. An assertion of the privilege has never been conceived of as a substitute for
exculpatory or affirmative evidence in a civil proceeding. See In re Sterling-Harris
Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1963); Sahn v. Pagano, 302 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1962).
87. 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).
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pline.5s He contended that, just before his disciplinary hearing
commenced, he was warned by a deputy warden that his si-
lence could be used against him. Plaintiff alleged that his
right against self-incrimination was infringed at the hearing
because he was not assured of use immunity with respect to
incriminating testimony, and that he was penalized for his
silence.89
In its initial decision,9" the court of appeals held that Gar-
rity and its progeny applied. In the court's view, the plaintiff
was faced with the dilemma of either remaining silent "and
risking greater punishment from the disciplinary board" 91 or
speaking out and risking self-incrimination in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. The court concluded that a prisoner fac-
ing disciplinary action is entitled to use immunity for state-
ments made at his disciplinary hearing, and should be notified
of this right at the outset.2
The Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration
in light of an intervening decision," and the court of appeals
reaffirmed its earlier decision, but not without some major
modifications. 4 The court withdrew any suggestion that a
prisoner is constitutionally entitled to use immunity for his
statements at a disciplinary hearing.95 Moreover, the court
withdrew its finding that prison officials may compel a pris-
88. Id. at 1281.
89. Id. at 1282.
90. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).
91. Id. at 1288. It is unclear whether the court was suggesting that plaintiff was
subjected to greater punishment in retaliation for his failure to testify, or whether it
simply meant that plaintiff's punishment might be greater due to the loss of an op-
portunity to explain his version of the facts or to argue mitigation (compare with
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)). The appellate court's later opinion is
factually consistent with that of the Supreme Court: plaintiff's silence at the hearing
might form the basis of an adverse inference against him on the merits, but he was
not subjected to punishment simply for having asserted his privilege. Palmigiano v.
Baxter, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam), rev'd 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
92. 487 F.2d at 1289-90.
93. 418 U.S. 908 (1974).
94. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
95. To this extent, the court of appeals merely reconciled its position with United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970), which found nothing unconstitutional in the pur-
suit of civil proceedings against an individual, even under the shadow of potential
criminal prosecution. But Kordel is not even mentioned in the two court of appeals'
opinions in this case.
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oner's testimony where use immunity has been granted."'
However, the court again held that a prisoner's silence at a
disciplinary hearing may not be used against him at that time
or in any future proceeding.
The Supreme Court reversed.9 7 The Court took an im-
portant first step in stating, without discussion, that prison
disciplinary hearings are not criminal proceedings.98 Accord-
ingly, the rule of Griffin v. California" was not directly appli-
cable. The Court then considered the question of whether it is
permissible to attach evidentiary weight to a party's silence in
a civil proceeding, assuming that he is entitled to assert the
privilege.100 The Court held that an affirmative answer to this
question does not contradict the principle of Garrity and its
progeny. In those cases, the Court said, the state directly
sought to compel testimony without granting immunity,
through the imposition of threats and reprisals in cases where
the individual failed to freely testify. In the present case, the
state had not insisted or even asked that the prisoner waive
96. The court's remarkable position is as follows:
[W]e now realize that allowing prison officials to coerce testimony where they
wish by extending immunity has awesome implications. It cheapens the Fifth
Amendment. Immunity could be given where it would be scant recompense for
the consequences of coerced testimony. There is also the institutional problem.
Since prison officials themselves lack the authority to grant immunity, formal
judicial proceedings and a full stenographic transcript would be required. Our
prior decision did not take such considerations into account.
510 F.2d at 536. Perhaps the appellate court was justified in its perception that com-
pelling testimony upon a grant of use immunity "cheapens" the fifth amendment, but
that issue was no longer open to dispute in 1974. See notes 20-21, supra, and accom-
panying text. Only two years previously the Supreme Court had held that use immu-
nity satisfies the constitutional requirement, reaffirming that immunity statutes have
"become part of our constitutional fabric." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
447 (1972) (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)). Kastigar
confirms that use immunity is constitutionally adequate recompense for the conse-
quences of coerced testimony.
97. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
98. While a disciplinary hearing is not a conventional criminal proceeding, it is
arguable that a proceeding in which the prisoner risks a substantial further depriva-
tion of liberty is sufficiently criminal that the Griffin rule should apply. See notes 40
& 41 and accompanying text, supra. Compare with note 19, supra, and text accom-
panying. Plaintiff was placed in punitive segregation as a result of this proceeding.
425 U.S. at 313. A detailed examination of this question is beyond the scope of this
article.
99. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
100. The Court has since viewed Baxter as stating a rule for civil proceedings
generally. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807 n.5 (1977).
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his privilege. He was informed of his right to remain silent,
but was also told that his silence could be used against him.10 1
The state did not automatically find him guilty of a discipli-
nary offense. His silence alone was not sufficient to support an
adverse decision by the disciplinary board. The silence of a
party to a civil proceeding may be given such evidentiary
weight as is warranted by the facts without "penalizing" him
for his assertion of the privilege. The court of appeals had fo-
cused solely upon the prisoner's fifth amendment interest and,
consequently, its rule had "little to do with a fair trial and
derogate[d] rather than improve[d] the chances for accurate
decisions. 10 2
The dissent criticized the Court's approval of a rule per-
mitting adverse inferences in civil actions, emphasizing that
such inferences may well be acceptable in civil cases involving
only private parties,10 3 but arguing that the privilege is in-
fringed upon where a government official knowingly seeks in-
formation that may be self-incriminating and then draws ad-
verse inferences from the individual's privileged decision to
remain silent. Because a fundamental purpose of the privilege
is to guard against governmental inquisition of suspected
criminals, the dissent reasoned that a rule permitting adverse
inferences would aid, and even encourage, government cir-
cumvention of our adversary system.
The rules to be derived from both Kordel and Baxter are
consistent with Simmons v. United States1 °0 and the more re-
cent cases concerning the burdening of constitutional rights.
Neither Kordel nor Baxter punish or penalize one who asserts
the privilege against self-incrimination, and in that sense the
Garrity line of cases is inapposite. Also, neither rule need-
lessly burdens an assertion of the privilege because each is
fully supported by a legitimate public interest. In Kordel, the
strong public interest in timely and efficient enforcment of
statutory obligations was recognized.' 5 In Baxter, the Court
101. Compare with note 91, supra.
102. 425 U.S. at 319.
103. 425 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See notes 47-71 supra, and accompanying text.
105. 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (footnote omitted):
The public interest in protecting consumers throughout the Nation from mis-
branded drugs requires prompt action by the agency charged with responsibil-
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implicitly concluded that a general rule permitting adverse in-
ferences in civil proceedings, as described above,108 would fur-
ther the likelihood of a fair trial and justice." 7
Kordel and Baxter also do not impair to any appreciable
extent the policies underlying the privilege. As Brown v.
United Statesl08 demonstrates, even where the government is
a participant in the civil litigation and a threat of self-incrimi-
nation is apparent, the privilege will not be construed in dis-
regard of the interests of the adversary or the interests of the
judicial process in ascertaining the truth. A degree of tension
between the state's interests and an individual's right to re-
main silent is inevitable, and a rule that simply immunizes
one who asserts the privilege from the conventional rules of
civil justice would overreach the policies of the privilege and
frustrate the civil enforcement of federal law. The civil pro-
cess confers no special powers on the government as litigant.
The judicial process itself is a safeguard against political, reli-
gious, or other forms of persecution. The rigorous Hoffman L9
standard for overruling unjustified assertions of the privilege
still applies with full force in civil litigation, and the princi-
ples expressed in Garrity prohibit judicial devices that punish
or penalize one who asserts the privilege in civil litigation."0
Kordel and Baxter merely demonstrate that an assertion of
the privilege in a civil proceeding is not without rational, le-
gitimate consequences.
ity for administration of the federal food and drug laws. But a rational decision
whether to proceed criminally against those responsible for the misbranding
may have to await consideration of a fuller record than that before the agency
at the time of the civil seizure of the offending products. It would stultify en-
forcement of federal law to require a government agency such as the FDA inva-
riably to choose either to forgo recommendation of a criminal prosecution once
it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the outcome of a crim-
inal trial.
106. See notes 97-101 supra, and accompanying text.
107. 425 U.S. at 319: "It is important to note here that the position adopted by
the Court of Appeals is rooted in the Fifth Amendment and the policies which it
serves. It has little to do with a fair trial and derogates rather than improves the
chances for accurate decisions."
108. 356 U.S. 148 (1958). See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
109. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See notes 24-27 supra, and
accompanying text.
110. Compare with notes 68-71 supra, and accompanying text.
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V. PROBLEMS UNIQUE TO CIVIL LITIGATION
In two particular areas, the federal courts have been grop-
ing for an appropriate method of analysis to use in solving
privilege problems. The first problem area concerns the dis-
tinction between plaintiffs and defendants in civil proceedings
and the different consequences which flow from their respec-
tive assertions of the fifth amendment privilege. The second
concerns the inability of an artificial legal entity, such as a
corporation, to assert the personal privilege against self-
incrimination.
Various courts have held that a plaintiff who asserts the
fifth amendment privilege is rightly treated less favorably
than is a defendant who asserts the privilege.111 Since it is the
plaintiff who seeks to disturb the status quo through litiga-
tion, the shield afforded by the privilege cannot be converted
into a plaintiff's sword. Many federal courts have derived this
proposition from Lyons v. Johnson,1 12 an appellate decision
which utilized the shield/sword metaphor. 113 Lyons was a civil
rights action in which the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, resisted
any and all discovery on grounds of the fifth amendment priv-
ilege. Faced with either abandonment of the discovery process
or dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, the court chose the latter.
While a party may assert the privilege in response to specific
discovery requests, he cannot, for example, refuse to be de-
posed altogether.114 Nonetheless, a number of federal district
courts chose to follow Lyons in less justifiable circum-
stances.11 5 Some courts have held that a plaintiff construc-
111. See, e.g., Penn Communications Specialties, Inc. v. Hess, 65 F.R.D. 510 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Brown v. Ames, 346 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Minn. 1972).
112. 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970).
113. Id. at 542: "Her obtaining of this shield, however, could not provide a sword
to her for achieving assertion of her claims against defendants without having to con-
form to the processes necessary to orderly and equal forensic functioning."
But see Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. E.g., Nat'1 Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 615 F.2d
595 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Foss v. Gerstein, 58 F.R.D. 627 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
This point is intuitively apparent, because otherwise the court is deprived of any
meaningful opportunity to determine whether the party's fear of self-incrimination is
justified.
115. Penn Communications Specialties, Inc. v. Hess, 65 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Bramble v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Colo. 1973) (alternative hold-
ing), aff'd, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); Brown v.
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tively waives the privilege by filing a lawsuit, while other
courts have simply concluded that it is unfair for a plaintiff to
have his lawsuit and his privilege too.116
A different trend had its inception in suits challenging tax
jeopardy assessments. 117 By statute,118 injunctions are rarely
available to restrain federal tax assessments,11 9 in part be-
cause it is desired that litigation against the tax collector be
confined to a refund action. 120 Jeopardy assessments are often
utilized against taxpayers engaged in illegal activities. 1 2 As a
Ames, 346 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Minn. 1972). See Jones v. B.C. Chrisopher & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979).
116. See generally Comment, Penalizing the Civil Litigant Who Invokes the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 541, 543-46 (1972); Com-
ment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L. F.
75, 78; Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52
VA. L. REV. 322, 333-35 (1966). Cf. Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp.
141, 149 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (refusal to answer questions may have been contrary to a
provision in the insurance policy), aff'd, 416 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969). One federal
district court accepted the waiver doctrine in a 1958 decision, Independent, Produc-
tion Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), essentially adopting the
position taken in Professor Moore's treatise on federal practice. 4 MooRE's FEDEMR
PRAcTmcE 1 26.60[6] (2d ed. 1979):
Now what about privileges in private litigation? Some, such as the attor-
ney-client privilege, could not normally be held to be waived by bringing or
defending a suit, for in the attorney-client situation the privilege is designed to
promote confidential relations that may well deal with the very suit in ques-
tion. But assume that plaintiff seeks to replevy some bonds and his title is the
basic issue; and to a properly framed and relevant question concerning owner-
ship he refuses to answer on the ground that his answer might tend to incrimi-
nate him. While it would be reasonable not to compel a disclosure and thus
respect his claim to that extent, does fairness not demand that plaintiff's ac-
tion be stayed, for reasonable time, to permit him to change his mind and, in
the absence of a change, to dismiss his action? In the converse situation if the
defendant invokes the privilege, does fairness not demand that plaintiff's claim
of title be taken as admitted?
This passage is memorable, if not for the waiver theory, then because Moore envi-
sions no distinction between the position of a plaintiff and a defendant. In his view,
both adversaries should be subject to this waiver theory, on grounds of fairness.
117. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6851, 6861, 6862.
118. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).
119. A typically unsuccessful example is Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109
(7th Cir. 1975).
120. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1962).
121. In considering the 1976 amendments to existing tax legislation, the House
and Senate Committee reports called attention to a G.A.O. report which concluded
that "most" jeopardy and termination assessments were being utilized against tax-
payers engaged in illegal activities. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 302
(1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 362-63 (1976). Both are reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 3198-99, 3792-93.
1980]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
result, such taxpayers are forced to bring a refund action and
thereby become plaintiffs. Hence, if refund actions could be
dismissed because a plaintiff asserted his fifth amendment
privilege, many plaintiffs would have no judicial recourse
against an unjustifiable or excessive assessment.122
In several such instances,123 the government has sought
dismissal of the refund action following the plaintiff's asser-
tion of the privilege in response to relevant discovery. The ap-
pellate courts have uniformly rejected the government's posi-
tion. 12' Recognizing the plaintiff's due process right in his
property, these courts have proposed a variety of remedies.
For example, after a complaint is timely filed, the proceedings
might be stayed until the conclusion of any related criminal
action, or until the expiration of all applicable criminal litiga-
tion periods.125 Alternatively, the government could secure a
grant of use immunity for a plaintiff's testimony.126
This approach has not been restricted to tax assessment
cases; there are other situations where an individual must be-
come a plaintiff to recover property wrested from him by the
government.127 However, even in dissimilar situations, the dis-
missal of a plaintiff's complaint for his assertion of the self-
incrimination privilege to block relevant discovery has been
viewed as an unconstitutional punishment or penalty for exer-
cising one's right to remain silent.128 Such dismissals have also
been viewed as a deprivation of a plaintiff's due process
122. The 1976 Tax Reform Act included a relevant amendment, 26 U.S.C. § 7429.
123. Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1976); Shaffer v. United
States, 528 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1975). See Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973).
124. Id.
125. See Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040
(1973).
126. Shaffer v. United States, 528 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1975). In Backos v. United
States, 82 F.R.D. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1979), the district court concluded that, in such a
case, no relief is appropriate against a plaintiff for failure to comply with discovery,
finding that all other alternatives are unsatisfactory.
127. E.g., United States v. Second Nat'l Bank of Nashua, 48 F.R.D. 268 (D. N.H.
1969).
128. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), peti-
tion for rehearing denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980); Campbell v. Gerrans, 592
F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979) (limiting scope of court's prior decision in Lyons v. Johnson,
415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970)); Justice v.




The question remains, however, whether a plaintiff's privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his right to procedural due
process outweigh his adversary's due process rights and the
public's interest in ascertaining the truth. Some courts have
assumed that any judicial response to a valid assertion of the
privilege offends the Garrity principle.130 One appellate court
has held that the trial judge must balance the competing con-
stitutional and procedural rights.131 The court reasoned that
dismissal was generally an improper sanction for plaintiff's as-
sertion of the privilege against relevant discovery, but might
be warranted as a remedy to prevent unfairness. 13 2 However,
dismissal would be appropriate only when other less burden-
some remedies would be ineffective in preventing unfairness
to a defendant.'33 Thus, the appellate court concluded that
the plaintiff's deposition should be stayed until the applicable
criminal statute of limitations had expired.""
The second, more limited, problem concerning the privi-
lege in civil cases arises from the rule that artificial legal enti-
ties cannot assert the privilege. For example, when a corpora-
tion is a party to a civil proceeding, its adversary is entitled to
serve interrogatories upon it 3 5 and to depose its directors, of-
ficers and other managing agents. 38 While the corporation has
129. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir.
1979), petition for rehearing denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. E.g., Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979); Justice v.
Laudermilch, 78 F.R.D. 201 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
131. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), peti-
tion for rehearing denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980).
132. 608 F.2d at 1087 n.6.
133. Id.
134. The Wehling court's ruling carefully left open a variety of options: (1) Defen-
dant might seek a lesser remedy than dismissal upon a showing that it was prejudiced
by the stay, and if it were deprived of crucial information which otherwise would
have been available then even dismissal might be appropriate; (2) All discovery not
implicating plaintiff's privilege should proceed, and defendant could choose to waive
the remaining discovery and proceed to trial; and (3) The court acknowledged possi-
ble difficulties if plaintiff is indicted (for example, just before the statute of limita-
tions runs) and briefly discussed some factors to be considered by the trial judge then
in determining whether or not to extend the stay. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for rehearing denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th
Cir. 1980).
135. FED. R. Crv. P. 33(a).
136. E.g., FaD. R. Crv. P. 30(b)(6), 37(b)(2).
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no privilege against self-incrimination, its personnel may as-
sert their privilege individually with respect to corporate mat-
ters in proper circumstances. 13 7 Arguably, the corporation may
be subjected to discovery sanctions where corporate agents re-
fuse to provide relevant information, even if those individuals
justifiably fear personal self-incrimination.1 8
The principles applied to the distinction between asser-
tions of the privilege by plaintiffs and assertions by defen-
dants are also pertinent to this question. While a corporation
possesses no constitutional privilege, it does have a due pro-
cess right to a judicial determination of its claims or de-
fenses.1"' Even though the burden of sanctions upon the cor-
poration may not present a Garrity-type problem,1 40 the
corporation should be accorded Garrity-type protection where
the failure to provide relevant information stems from the
fifth amendment rights of corporate personnel. Some federal
courts, however, have rejected this view.1 41
A narrow emphasis on the applicability of the fifth amend-
ment privilege threatens to distort the judgment at issue. The
distinctions drawn between plaintiffs and defendants, and in-
dividuals and artificial entities, may obscure rather than clar-
ify the underlying values at stake.
VI. RECONCILIATION OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The due process interests of each party and the judicial
interest in ascertaining the truth are at the heart of any at-
tempt to reconcile the fifth amendment privilege with civil lit-
igation. Any assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding im-
plicates competing constitutional and procedural rights. 14 2
137. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
138. In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Pa. 1979);
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Inde-
pendent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 1973).
139. E.g., Emerick v. Fenick Industries, Inc., 539 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1976).
See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209-13 (1958); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632
(1962).
140. See George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968).
141. See note 138 supra.
142. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), peti-
tion for rehearing denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Consequently, rather than emphasizing decisive ultimate val-
ues, a range of solutions must be considered, even if not all of
the solutions are suitable in every situation.
An initial option might be to allow the trial judge to com-
pel the witness to answer relevant questions over his assertion
of the privilege, with the understanding that under Garrity,1"
the compelled testimony and its fruits would be excluded in
any subsequent criminal proceeding. This approach would, in
effect, constitute an indirect judicial grant of use immunity,
since the trial judge would compel the testimony knowing full
well that the testimony could not be used in a subsequent
criminal action.
The federal courts, however, have uniformly rejected any
judicial grant of immunity based upon nonconstitutional con-
siderations. 14' Because the power to grant immunity has tradi-
tionally been funneled by statute through a designated group
of federal officials, the courts have viewed this authority as
denied to federal judges. The federal immunity statute 45
reserves only a ministerial role for the judiciary, thereby
preventing judges from making the necessary nonconstitu-
tional policy judgments which enter into a decision to grant
immunity. Situations to be distinguished, however, are those
where the trial judge erroneously overrules an assertion of the
privilege;1 46 where testimony is compelled under a state im-
munity grant that would otherwise subject the witness to fed-
eral prosecution;147 and, perhaps, where due process requires
the immunization of a witness whose testimony is essential to
a criminal defense. 48 The judiciary has fashioned rights of
immunity in these circumstances only because it is constitu-
tionally required. Thus, any judicial decision to expand the
143. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
144. In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1094-95 (5th
Cir. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 872 n.11 (7th Cir.
1979) (dictum); In Re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
145. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976).
146. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 78 (1973). The Garrity principle establishes the same point. In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. 618, 624-25 (N.D. IlM 1979).
147. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
148. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Garrity immunity is unauthorized and reversible error.149
Another proposed option is to allow the trial judge to com-
pel testimony subject to a protective order barring public ac-
cess to the testimony.8 0 Testimony given pursuant to a civil
protective order may be insulated from civil discovery.151
However, due to the powers of a grand jury, 52 a civil protec-
tive order could not assure nondisclosure to criminal discov-
ery. Moreover, this proposal assumes that Garrity would bar
the admission of the testimony, or its fruits, in a criminal pro-
ceeding if the protective order were violated. 158 In view of the
cases denying that there is judicial power to grant immu-
nity,'" an attempt to compel testimony by simply granting a
149. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 872 n.11 (7th Cir.
1979) (dictum).
What if the witness' testimony previously has been compelled under a grant of use
immunity in a criminal proceeding, and that testimony is utilized in questioning the
witness during a civil proceeding? It would appear that any testimony so elicited in
the civil proceeding is "tainted" by its derivation from the prior compelled testimony,
and cannot subject the witness to a risk of subsequent prosecution since its exclusion
would be required.
Various courts have held that, accordingly, the witness cannot refuse the testi-
mony in the civil proceeding on fifth amendment grounds, since the inevitability of
the "taint" removes the threat of self-incrimination. Little Rock School Dist. v. Bor-
den, Inc., [1980-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) % 63,522 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980); In re Starkey,
600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979); Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir.
1975) (alternative holding). Contra, In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litigation,
620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980).
Once a witness has submitted immunized testimony, the incremental hindrance of
the prosecutor's function if that testimony is used in a civil proceeding must be
slight. If a subsequent criminal proceeding is to be brought (other than for perjury in
the immunized testimony), the government is already committed to its heavy affirma-
tive burden of proving that its evidence is not derived from the immunized testimony
or its fruits by demonstrating an independent, legitimate source for it. Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). Further, the option of securing a separate
grant of immunity for the civil proceeding (thus respecting executive prerogatives to
the utmost) may not even be available, as discussed in the text below.
150. Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Dis-
covery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U.S.F.L. Rv.
12 (1968).
151. Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).
Contra, Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
900 (1964). See United States v. GAF Corp., 596 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); Ex parte
Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915).
152. E.g., Branzeburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-88 (1972).
153. Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Dis-
covery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U.S.F.L. Rv.
12 (1968).
154. See notes 144-49 supra.
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protective order would also be reversible error without a grant
of statutory use immunity.
Since the discretion to grant immunity falls exclusively
within the executive branch of government, a request could be
made that the prosecutor secure a grant of immunity for the
purposes of the civil proceeding. Where the government is not
a participant in the civil litigation, however, no grant of im-
munity can or will be extended,15 5 although this interpretation
is not required by the text of the immunity statute.1 56 The
possibility of a grant of immunity remains open when the gov-
ernment is a participant in the civil proceedings.
Assuming circumstances in which the testimony cannot be
compelled, one alternative may be to stay the potentially in-
criminatory discovery until all criminal actions have termi-
nated and all applicable criminal statutes of limitation have
run. KordeI,157 however, established that a civil defendant is
not constitutionally entitled to a stay of the civil proceeding
simply because he fears self-incrimination. 58 But, this does
not rule out, as Kordel recognized, the possibility that a stay
may be appropriate for nonconstitutional policy reasons.15'
Therefore, a stay of the potentially incriminatory discovery is
certainly available as an alternative to more intrusive reme-
dies.16 0 However, a stay can be far from a perfect solution.
While a plaintiff may be expected to prefer a speedy disposi-
tion, once his fear of self-incrimination has eased, a civil de-
fendant may have no desire to proceed. For instance, long de-
lays may discourage plaintiffs from going forward with even
meritorious claims because of burdensome financial
155. In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th
Cir. 1980) (dictum). See Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-2] TRAE CAS.
(CCH) 63,522 at 76,781 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1046
(8th Cir. 1979).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976).
157. 397 U.S. 1 (1969).
158. 397 U.S. at 11. Appellate decisions rejecting constitutional claims of this sort
are common. See, e.g., Diebold v. Civil Service Comm'n, 611 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1979); Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477
(1st Cir. 1977); DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970). But cf. S.E.C. v. Stewart,
476 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1973) (mandamus petition refused).
159. 397 U.S. at 12 n.27.
160. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), peti-
tion for rehearing denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1980); see Iannelli v. Long, 487




If the incriminating testimony involves a continuing crimi-
nal offense or conspiracy, then the necessary length of the
stay may be impossible to determine because only a criminal
trial would define the point at which the statute of limitations
period would expire.181 Also, the witness may argue that the
testimony might furnish a link in a chain of evidence impli-
cating him in an incomplete offense. In fact, given the limited
permissible inquiry into the validity of a privilege claim,8 2 the
trial court often may not be able to fix the duration of a stay
with reasonable certainty. Hence, a discovery stay may often
be unsatisfactory, thus forcing the trial court to consider other
alternatives. Moreover, the other party should be entitled to
proceed to trial without the privileged testimony,6 3 and may
be entitled to some ancillary relief.
Another viable alternative is the Baxter rule" which per-
mits the fact finder to consider a party's assertion of the privi-
lege, even though there may be some confusion as to precisely
what may be inferred from the assertion. Baxter held that a
party's silence, in the face of adverse evidence, may be given
whatever weight the finder of fact deems it deserves under the
circumstances. The inference, however, does not arise from
the mere assertion of the privilege, but from the party's fail-
ure to come forward in rebuttal at trial with evidence within
his power to produce.16 5 Thus, opposing counsel may properly
161. When a conspiracy offense is at issue, it must be shown that the conspiracy
still existed and that at least one overt act (where one is an element of the offense)
occurred within the applicable limitation period prior to the return of the indictment.
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957); United States v. Nowak, 448
F.2d 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972). Evidence of unlawful agree-
ment and of other conduct occurring beyond the limitation period prior to the return
of the indictment is admissible as showing the scheme and intent. E.g., United States
v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975).
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976) provides a five year limitation period for noncapital fede-
ral offenses, except where a different period is fixed by statute. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3281 (1976), there is generally no limitation period for federal capital offenses.
162. 341 U.S. 749 (1951).
163. Wehing v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 611 F.2d 1026,-1027 (5th Cir. 1980).
This point is implicit in United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970), which held that
the individual defendants could have asserted their fifth amendment privileges in re-
sponse to discovery, where appropriate, but also that these defendants were not con-
stitutionally entitled to a stay of the civil action pending the criminal outcome.
164. See 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
165. See Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
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argue that his client's evidence is undisputed and determina-
tive due to the opposing party's assertion of his right to re-
main silent, e16 and the fact finder may give this factor such
weight as he deems appropriate. 67
Another remedy to be considered by the trial court is an
order which precludes the party asserting the privilege from
offering other evidence that bears on the points covered by
the refused testimony.'68 This remedy prevents any utilization
of the privilege to produce a favorably incomplete showing on
factual issues. However, such an order may effectively pre-
clude a claim or defense where, for example, the refused testi-
mony relates to the central issues in a lawsuit. In order to
utilize such a remedy, the trial court must obtain a compre-
hensive understanding of the disputed factual questions and
their relative importance. An order dismissing the action, or
even a default judgment, may be justified after weighing all
the relevant factors.6 9
Access to related proof from other sources may mitigate
any unfairness that results from a party claiming the privi-
lege. However, the court should consider the probative value
of the refused testimony, and may conclude that a party's ac-
cess to other proof is inadequate. The evaluation of a dispute
is a slippery task at the discovery stage, and is perhaps better
reserved for consideration near the time of trial.170 If a witness
nation, 24 U. CHI. L. Rav. 472, 474 (1957).
166. Contrast the rule for criminal trials, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
In Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958), where no fifth amendment privilege was involved
(but the failure to produce documents was involuntary), the Court noted the possibil-
ity that "in the absence of complete disclosure by petitioner, the District Court would
be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to particular events."
167. E.H. Boerth v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635 (D. Minn. 1979), includes a
jury instruction. Bench trials on point include: Henricksen v. Henricksen, 486 F.
Supp. 622, 628-29 (E.D. Wis. 1980); C.F.T.C. v. U.S. Metals Depository Co., 468 F.
Supp. 1149, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585, 591 (M.D. La. 1979).
168. See Rubenstein v. Kleven, 150 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1957). See also In re
Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
169. In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364, 367 (M.D. Pa.
1979).
170. Compare Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 360, 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd, 283 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1960), with Independent Productions
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) and Independent Produc-
tions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 19, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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has made his privileged information available to one party,
however, another party should be permitted to discover it
without need of a special ruling.171
The nature of the proceeding and the parties may be a rel-
evant consideration in framing an appropriate remedy. Be-
cause the fifth amendment privilege was created as a protec-
tion against governmental abuse of individuals, the courts
may be less receptive to civil remedies that indirectly discour-
age a party from asserting his privilege where the government
is the adverse party. Similarly, the due process clause of the
fifth amendment is intended to prevent arbitrary government
action against private persons. Although the government is
also entitled to a fair trial,172 the courts may be more reserved
in fashioning remedies to protect a party's assertion of his
privilege when the civil interests of the government, rather
than those of a private party, are at stake. Where a civil pro-
ceeding by the government is closely linked to the enforce-
ment of a criminal law, 173 or where a private plaintiff sues to
recover property taken from his possession by the govern-
171. If, for example, a present or former employee of a corporate defendant has
discussed his knowledge with corporate counsel, then the adversary can discover the
information. The corporation cannot assert the constitutional privilege in response to
interrogatories, and must appoint an agent who can sign the answers without fear of
self-incrimination. Even the corporation's attorney can be a sufficient agent for pur-
poses of preparing and signing answers. See note 79 supra. The answers to interroga-
tories must, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a), give such information as is available to
the corporation. Such information would include information known to its corporate
counsel. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947) (dictum); General Dynamics
Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 1973). While the discovery
may implicate some individual in criminal activity, the person signing answers to in-
terrogatories or answering deposition questions cannot assert the privilege for another
person who is so implicated, and the person implicated cannot interpose the privilege
to block discovery from another. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D.
417, 419 (N.D. IM. 1977). See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976).
The work product doctrine should not bar production of any such statement given to
corporate counsel, because the substantial need/undue hardship exception to FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3), would apply. Thus, the other party should be able to discover the
gist of the information through interrogatories. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
513 (1947). This reasoning is, of course, subject to the distinction, for attorney-client
privilege purposes, between the "communication" itself and the substantive informa-
tion conveyed, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), assuming that the
attorney-client privilege might otherwise apply.
172. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1947); United States v. Tijerina,
412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
173. E.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 925 (1975).
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ment,17 ' remedies which burden the private party's assertion
of the privilege are sure to be less favored.Conversely, a pri-
vate party seeking affirmative relief against the government,
which is available only on account of waiver of the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity, may expect a more rigorous rem-
edy for his assertion of privilege.
175
VII. CONCLUSION
Assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination may have important ramifications in federal
civil proceedings. In considering an appropriate response to a
party's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege in civil liti-
gation, a court must limit itself to the goals of fairness to the
adversary and due regard for the judicial duty to ascertain the
truth. Notions of deterrence have no place in this process.
176
The trial judge must seek the remedy that best reconciles
these legitimate goals with the assertion of the privilege and
which, at the same time, has the least restrictive impact upon
the party asserting the privilege.1 77 Needless impositions upon
the freedom to assert the privilege are impermissible. A deft-
174. E.g., Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1976); Patrick v.
United States, 524 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1975); Shaffer v. United States, 528 F.2d 920
(4th Cir. 1975); Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1040 (1973); Backos v. United States, 82 F.R.D. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1979); United States
v. Second Nat'l Bank of Nashua, 48 F.R.D. 268 (D. N.H. 1969). Another example is
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1958):
[Pletitioner's position is more analogous to that of a defendant, for it belatedly
challenges the Government's action by now protesting against a seizure and
seeking the recovery of assets which were summarily possessed by the Alien
Property Custodian without the opportunity for protest by any party claiming
that seizure was unjustified under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
(emphasis in original).
175. Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953):
The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prose-
cutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscion-
able to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental
privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his
defense. Such rationale has no application in a civil forum where the Govern-
ment is not the moving party, but is a defendant only on terms to which it has
consented.
176. Thus the rationale of National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976), does not apply.
177. See Berger, Burdening the Fifth Amendment: Toward a Presumptive
Barrier Theory, 70 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 27, 38-39 (1979).
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nition of the court's rightful role when the privilege is prop-
erly asserted in federal civil litigation is an important first
step towards reconciling these goals with this important con-
stitutional privilege.
